Some of the content of these papers almost certainly will not reflect the official view of the UKNDA.
UKNDA discussion paper
New Partnerships for Fighter Aircraft Development
By Steve Coltman
There has recently been published an interesting couple of articles – one from Tom Enders, boss of Airbus proposing in the Times that BAe Systems joins its fighter jet arm with that of Airbus to create a giant that can take on the US. The other one is from BAe itself, showing some design concepts for a new British fighter plane, the Tempest. It is described in a RUSI document as a twin-engine large stealth aircraft along the lines of the J-20 and the F-22.
This is quite a complex issue. Some might object on doctrinal grounds – we don’t want to go in with the Europeans, we are trying to get out of Europe aren’t we? I think the answer to this is – it’s not politics Enders was talking about, it’s business. With the civil aerospace business, the medium-sized countries of Europe could not compete with the US until they combined their resources, and when they did so they competed very successfully indeed. Enders seems to be suggesting the same logic applies with military aircraft.
Well, maybe. There is a big difference however between military and civil aircraft. The latter are bought and built and operated for purely commercial reasons. Military aircraft are be built by aerospace companies to make a profit, but they are bought and operated by air forces for operational, defence and security reasons. In principle, if a country buys for its air force the wrong type of aircraft it does not matter to the aerospace companies that built the aircraft so long as they get paid, but to the nations who buy the wrong aircraft the consequences could be dire if it comes to the test of war.
Enders’ proposal may make a certain business sense but does it make operational sense? Maybe, maybe not. The over-riding priority is defence and security. We must buy the right kind of aircraft in the right numbers.
There is a cautionary tale to be told about the Tornado. Back in the seventies and eighties it was designed to meet the needs of four different air forces that had seriously diverging requirements. The RAF wanted a long-range strike plane to attack targets behind enemy lines, targets such as bridges, power stations, headquarters and airfields etc. so as to disrupt the flow of enemy reinforcements to the front line. The West German Naval Air Service (The Marinefleiger) wanted a maritime strike aircraft to sink Soviet warships. So far so good, the same aircraft fitted with different weapons can do both of these jobs. The West German Air Force (the Luftwaffe) wanted a close air support aircraft, a significantly different kind of strike plane to the needs of the RAF and Marinefleiger. The Luftwaffe needed a shorter-range strike plane to directly support the combat troops on the ground. The Italian air force wanted an air defence fighter. So how did it pan out? For the RAF and Marinefleiger it was fine, they got the aircraft they wanted. The Luftwaffe got a bigger, longer-ranged, more sophisticated and expensive aircraft than they needed. They ended up performing the close air support role using a combination of Tornados plus Alfa-Jets, the latter being trainer aircraft, rather small and unsophisticated for the role. The Italians wanted a fighter and got a bomber.
The moral of the story is that multi-national combat aircraft only make sense from a security and defence point of view if the different countries need the same sort of aircraft and although some divergence in requirements can be accommodated, there are limits.
So – do the defence needs of Germany, France and Britain coincide enough to make this fighter idea work from a defence point of view?
The Germans may take a particular view of defence and decide they only need a short-medium range fighter to defend German and allied air space, rather than an aircraft that can range far and wide like the F-22 can. What does France need? Harder to say but they have made a very decent living out of exporting medium-weight fighter-bombers (Mirages etc.) and if that is what they decide upon, then we may have a problem. The Tempest proposal is for a heavyweight twin-engine fighter – something in the size category of the big Russian Sukhois, something along the lines of the Chinese J-20 and the US F-22. There is an argument that says this really is what the UK needs, something that can seriously contest for superiority in the air over the northern North Sea and the seas off Norway, as well as over Scandinavia generally, as well as elsewhere. The superior range and endurance of the big Russian Sukhois must surely put western European combat aircraft at some disadvantage in some scenarios.
It may well be that, from an operational viewpoint, Britain would find more common ground with Japan. Japan currently operates the heavyweight F-15 Eagle fighter. It is well known that Japan asked to buy the US F-22 heavyweight fighter and was refused. Japan has bought a limited number of the medium-weight F-35s but has also embarked on the production of their own fifth/sixth generation fighter. This will presumably be bigger and better than the F-35 or there would be no point in it.
We must be clear that the same problem viewed from political, commercial and operational perspectives may well lead to different conclusions. Politics are important up to a point. If we take one path we may alienate the Americans, which would be undesirable but no doubt we would patch things up in due course. Commercial and business considerations are important up to a point. Employment, profitability and export orders do matter. But operational requirements are the most important of all. If our armed forces are not properly equipped then it may influence not just if wars are fought or not fought, but also who wins if it does come down to it.
We should look for partners in the Tempest project because the cost of pursuing it alone might be more than the nation’s politicians can stomach. But we should go for partners whose operational requirements most closely match our own, and political and commercial considerations must be made to fit around the operational considerations. Buying the right military hardware is not mainly about diplomacy or profits – it may one day be a matter of life and death and the fate of nations.
https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/enter-tempest?utm_source=RUSI+Newsletter&utm_campaign=0d8779f882-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_20_04_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0c9bbb5ef0-0d8779f882-46274681
Steve Coltman, August 2018
This is quite a complex issue. Some might object on doctrinal grounds – we don’t want to go in with the Europeans, we are trying to get out of Europe aren’t we? I think the answer to this is – it’s not politics Enders was talking about, it’s business. With the civil aerospace business, the medium-sized countries of Europe could not compete with the US until they combined their resources, and when they did so they competed very successfully indeed. Enders seems to be suggesting the same logic applies with military aircraft.
Well, maybe. There is a big difference however between military and civil aircraft. The latter are bought and built and operated for purely commercial reasons. Military aircraft are be built by aerospace companies to make a profit, but they are bought and operated by air forces for operational, defence and security reasons. In principle, if a country buys for its air force the wrong type of aircraft it does not matter to the aerospace companies that built the aircraft so long as they get paid, but to the nations who buy the wrong aircraft the consequences could be dire if it comes to the test of war.
Enders’ proposal may make a certain business sense but does it make operational sense? Maybe, maybe not. The over-riding priority is defence and security. We must buy the right kind of aircraft in the right numbers.
There is a cautionary tale to be told about the Tornado. Back in the seventies and eighties it was designed to meet the needs of four different air forces that had seriously diverging requirements. The RAF wanted a long-range strike plane to attack targets behind enemy lines, targets such as bridges, power stations, headquarters and airfields etc. so as to disrupt the flow of enemy reinforcements to the front line. The West German Naval Air Service (The Marinefleiger) wanted a maritime strike aircraft to sink Soviet warships. So far so good, the same aircraft fitted with different weapons can do both of these jobs. The West German Air Force (the Luftwaffe) wanted a close air support aircraft, a significantly different kind of strike plane to the needs of the RAF and Marinefleiger. The Luftwaffe needed a shorter-range strike plane to directly support the combat troops on the ground. The Italian air force wanted an air defence fighter. So how did it pan out? For the RAF and Marinefleiger it was fine, they got the aircraft they wanted. The Luftwaffe got a bigger, longer-ranged, more sophisticated and expensive aircraft than they needed. They ended up performing the close air support role using a combination of Tornados plus Alfa-Jets, the latter being trainer aircraft, rather small and unsophisticated for the role. The Italians wanted a fighter and got a bomber.
The moral of the story is that multi-national combat aircraft only make sense from a security and defence point of view if the different countries need the same sort of aircraft and although some divergence in requirements can be accommodated, there are limits.
So – do the defence needs of Germany, France and Britain coincide enough to make this fighter idea work from a defence point of view?
The Germans may take a particular view of defence and decide they only need a short-medium range fighter to defend German and allied air space, rather than an aircraft that can range far and wide like the F-22 can. What does France need? Harder to say but they have made a very decent living out of exporting medium-weight fighter-bombers (Mirages etc.) and if that is what they decide upon, then we may have a problem. The Tempest proposal is for a heavyweight twin-engine fighter – something in the size category of the big Russian Sukhois, something along the lines of the Chinese J-20 and the US F-22. There is an argument that says this really is what the UK needs, something that can seriously contest for superiority in the air over the northern North Sea and the seas off Norway, as well as over Scandinavia generally, as well as elsewhere. The superior range and endurance of the big Russian Sukhois must surely put western European combat aircraft at some disadvantage in some scenarios.
It may well be that, from an operational viewpoint, Britain would find more common ground with Japan. Japan currently operates the heavyweight F-15 Eagle fighter. It is well known that Japan asked to buy the US F-22 heavyweight fighter and was refused. Japan has bought a limited number of the medium-weight F-35s but has also embarked on the production of their own fifth/sixth generation fighter. This will presumably be bigger and better than the F-35 or there would be no point in it.
We must be clear that the same problem viewed from political, commercial and operational perspectives may well lead to different conclusions. Politics are important up to a point. If we take one path we may alienate the Americans, which would be undesirable but no doubt we would patch things up in due course. Commercial and business considerations are important up to a point. Employment, profitability and export orders do matter. But operational requirements are the most important of all. If our armed forces are not properly equipped then it may influence not just if wars are fought or not fought, but also who wins if it does come down to it.
We should look for partners in the Tempest project because the cost of pursuing it alone might be more than the nation’s politicians can stomach. But we should go for partners whose operational requirements most closely match our own, and political and commercial considerations must be made to fit around the operational considerations. Buying the right military hardware is not mainly about diplomacy or profits – it may one day be a matter of life and death and the fate of nations.
https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/enter-tempest?utm_source=RUSI+Newsletter&utm_campaign=0d8779f882-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_20_04_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0c9bbb5ef0-0d8779f882-46274681
Steve Coltman, August 2018
UKNDA discussion paper
Defence Procurement and Funding
By Peter s Walton
In 1985 I was a Colonel (late Royal Army Ordnance Corps) stationed at Chilwell, Nottinghamshire and responsible for the provision and supply forward of parts for all tracked and wheeled vehicles in use by the Army, and to some extent by the other two Services. I was responsible to the Director General of Ordnance Services, a two-star officer on the staff of the Quartermaster General (a MOD appointment). The work of Provision and Procurement was carried out chiefly by civil servants under their own managers who reported to me. I had a very small military staff who assisted in various areas. I was fed information from a wide variety of sources and could communicate as necessary with Supply staff world-wide. This was particularly important in the case of BAOR where I visited several times taking other members of the Team with me. I had a Finance Officer who was a civil servant who supported our work though she answered to the Procurement Executive in MOD. The full wiring diagram was complicated but the function worked quite well though we had identified grounds for improvement.
Then, in 1987, I was informed that the MOD had decided to commission a two-year review of its “Materials Management strategy”. The research was to be carried out by officers of the rank of Colonel (or equivalent in the other Services) and I was to be the Army member. The research team was to report via the Defence Supply Committee to the Principal Administrative Officers Committee (eg for the Army – the Quartermaster General). Two more individuals were added to the team: a senior Civil Servant representing the role of the Procurement Executive, and a team leader. This person was to be recruited from industry by or on behalf of the Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence – and in due course turned up (from the Shell Company where his role had been in the “Materials” field). Naturally he knew nothing about Defence. The Team was required to travel widely in UK and abroad, and was to deliver its final report to the Permanent Under Secretary at the MOD.
The Team’s allotted two years expired in 1989. Its report was prepared and ready for delivery when the Team Leader was called in by the PUS to give a preliminary verbal indication of the direction the report was taking. The Team was later informed by the Team Leader that the PUS had announced that he did not need the Team’s report as the Team’s work was to cease. He had already decided how to proceed. At about the same time the Team learned that this new “way forward” was based on the advice of the Lord Levene (whose procurement background and military knowledge were unknown). The team was given to understand at this time that the focus of the new Defence Materials procurement system was to be on costs. (Crucially there was no mention of the needs of the Services.) This information arrived verbally and no military member of the Team met the Permanent Under Secretary. No further discussion involving the Team took place and we dispersed.
I suggest that the trials of the MOD where procurement is concerned stem largely from this point and the less than logical decisions communicated by the PUS. I at once applied for early retirement from the Army. An attempt was made to stop me which I was able to avoid. More recently I have learned that the work of the PUS has become closely linked to the Treasury.
The decisions of the PUS MOD to abandon logical and careful examination of in-house Defence Procurement costing some thousands of £, even if in the Motor Vehicle area only, will turn out to have been at the root of the perverse decision to spend an absolutely massive amount of money on the construction of the facility at Abbey Wood. It is of course a very long way from London and very much more posh than Bicester? Before it was abandoned, the old system of funding requirements involved them being proposed annually as Estimates to the House of Commons, examined there, and then (if approved) sent back down in the form of Allocations. From then on a spending department had to live within those means, although there were obtuse ways of varying or extending them. Even though those of us who had an allocation on which to manage hated their inflexibility, the system worked and had done so in principle for hundreds of years. Its particular merit was that it prevented cash raids elsewhere when the allocation ran out due to poor management.
“Defence funding and management” are there to ensure that planned Defence activity can continue as planned and approved. Defence funds are not a useful pool in which to fish at will but a vital resource enabling the planned defence of the country. For everything else there must be contingency funding – entirely separate.
Peter S Walton - Colonel retd late RAOC (3rd August 2018)
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
Still a hole in our defences?
BY GRAHAM EDMONDS
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
To Sea or not to Sea?
BY GRAHAM EDMONDS
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
There are No Votes in Defence
By Fred Dupuy
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
The Carrot and the Stick: Soft Power and Hard Power,
Foreign Aid and Military Might
by Fred Dupuy
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
A Defence of the HMS Queen Elizabeth/F35B STOVEL Combination
by Fred Dupuy
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
Is British Defence Policy and Posture fit for purpose in 2017?
by Martin Cakebread
by Martin Cakebread
The UK’s Defence Policy and Posture is/are not fit for purpose in 2017, however, there is the opportunity to review and improve that situation, should the government choose to. However, time is fast running out for the UK to do so and cost cutting for the sake of saving money elsewhere for the Treasury is no longer acceptable.
What next for the British Army post 2020 withdrawal from Germany?
by Martin Cakebread
by Martin Cakebread
The simple fact of the matter is, withdrawal from Germany frees up an Armoured division at least, if not more, for deployment overseas.
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
Are Big Warships Really Sinking the Royal Navy?
by Fred Dupuy
by Fred Dupuy
When it comes to Acquisition & Procurement within the MOD, the system seems to impose constraints which result in delay, change, procrastination and excessive cost; it does not seem fit for purpose.
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
What are the consequences of a Royal Navy missile gap?
By Dr Alexander Clarke PhD
Recently the Government has announced that the Royal Navy will lose its Harpoon Anti-Surface Missiles in 2018, and despite the announcement about working with France that system is not due for service entry till 2035 (if the Perseus programme passes its 2020 transition from Concept to Assessment Phase). This means there will be, at the least - if unusually for a defence project, and especially a joint multi-national project it runs to time - a 17 year ‘capability holiday’.
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
Control of the UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
By Fred Dupuy
As a merchant seaman involved in the offshore oil and gas industry, I worked almost exclusively in the North Sea throughout the 1980s and into the 2nd half of the 1990s. Visits from the RN's fishery protection Island Class patrol boats and other government units were few and far between (there were then, seven Island and two Castle Class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)). In fact they were such infrequent visitors that it was obvious to all of us merchant types, and became a standing joke among us, that they did not know their patch!
A coastguard, operating numerous and relatively cheap (by Naval standards) but robust offshore cutters and with powers of arrest, would to my mind, be the obvious way to police what I hope will again become the UK's exclusive fishing grounds.
A coastguard, operating numerous and relatively cheap (by Naval standards) but robust offshore cutters and with powers of arrest, would to my mind, be the obvious way to police what I hope will again become the UK's exclusive fishing grounds.
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
Protection of the UK’s EEZ and Territorial Seas:
Does the Government care?
By Graham J.L. Edmonds
It is not surprising that illegal immigrants, frustrated by better security at European channel ports, have resorted to crossing the Dover Straits, English Channel and southern parts of the North Sea by fishing boat, yacht, RHIB and Gemini-type dinghies. It is reported that one delivery by yacht was made to Dittisham, a village a mile or so up the River Dart from Dartmouth.
The responsibility for controlling the United Kingdom’s borders and points of entry (ports, railway stations and airports) lies with the UK Border Force. It is a law-enforcement command within the Home Office and is accountable directly to ministers.
Concern has been raised within the media by politicians and other commentators that the physical resources of personnel, ships and aircraft available to Border Force to prevent an ‘invasion’ by sea are totally inadequate and embarrassingly pathetic in comparison to other coastal states.
UKNDA DISCUSSION PAPER
NATO or EU? The Way Forward for UK Defence & Security
By Graham J.L. Edmonds
NATO and the EU both have 28 members. Those that belong to NATO are described as ‘sovereign states’, whilst those of the EU as ‘national authorities’ or ‘member states’. Twenty-two EU nations belong to NATO; those that do not are Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Malta. Sweden stayed out of NATO in solidarity with Finland, which stays out so as not to antagonise Russia.
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty setting up NATO states that “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self- defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
Provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.
Currently, Montenegro has started accessions talks and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are aspiring members. It is believed that Sweden, under military threat from Russia, is considering foregoing its neutrality in order to join and gain the benefits of Article 5.
On the other hand the EU needs armed forces under command to substantiate its desire for political union. In a step-by-step process following the War in Kosovo, which included disbanding the ‘Western European Union (or NATO Europe) in 2010, the European Council agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”
A number of efforts were made to increase the EU's military capability by the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’ process from which the most concrete result is the EU Battlegroups initiative. EU member states were highly motivated – initially – to volunteer for the ‘Battlegroup roster’, but as the member states have to cover their own costs a certain level of reluctance has become apparent. Additionally many EU member states had simultaneous obligations to fulfil ISAF and the NATO Response Force commitments, for example. Further, and despite obvious occasions when EU Battlegroups should have been deployed (e.g. Congo in 2006/2008 and Libya 2011), slow political decision-making has meant that deployment has not occurred and there have been increasing ‘absenteeism’ in the standby roster.
The EU is further hamstrung by shortfalls in sealift and airlift capability, and by having to rely on the USA or extensive chartering to fill a significant military shortcoming.
In the 70 years since NATO was founded it has set in place and reformed a series of HQs, subordinate HQs and command centres. It has specifically set out to standardise equipment and logistics and virtually every component of equipment has a Nato Stock Number (NSN). Standardisation ensures that, for example, fuel hoses and connections for ships, aircraft and vehicles are common; communication and data links connect Treaty members, relevant intelligence is shared and common operating procedures ensure that military formations can co-operate together. Standing NATO Maritime Forces, in being since the 1960s are charged to improve and prove standardisation. English and French are NATO’s two working languages.
The UK has the 5th largest defence budget in the world and France the 6th. The UK and France together account for 40% of the EU's defence budget and 50% of its military capacity. Both are officially recognised nuclear weapon states and have permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council
Any EU force is obliged – if it is to function militarily – to use the organisation set up by NATO. Much common equipment, particularly in aircraft and missiles (ship, ground and air launched), is US in origin, support and training. Even the French Navy’s air arm (Aeronavale) conducts its carrier flying qualifications with the USN in the T45 Goshawk – a derivative of BAe Hawk trainer. EU operations such as the Libyan campaign of 2011 could not have ‘succeeded’ without considerable US air support (non-combat) operations in Air to Air Refuelling, Electronic Warfare, Reconnaissance and Intelligence, nor without an initial bombardment by land attack cruise missiles from USN ships and RN and USN submarines.
It is important to understand that the EU does not – yet – directly control EU military missions. When an EU military mission is agreed an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is nominated by the EU Council. The OHQ directs the Force Headquarters (FHQ), also provided by a member country, which carries out the operation. It is worthy of note that the European Council has no formal legislative power, it is a strategic (and crisis-solving!) body that provides the Union with general political directions and priorities and acts as a ‘collective presidency’. The European Commission remains the sole initiator of legislation, but the European Council is able to provide an impetus to guide legislative policy. Decisions of the European Council are taken by consensus, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.
When an EU operation is planned and conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the OHQ is automatically the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), (formerly SHAPE) at Mons. Without NATO support there is the option of using one of five national HQs provided by the French (2 HQs), the UK (PJHQ at the Northwood), Germany and Italy. Alternatively the EU has the option to use NATO facilities.
The EU has a military staff of some 200+ military and civilian personnel based in Brussels. It provides strategic advice to the High Representative and reports to the European Union Military Committee, an intergovernmental Council body made up of the Chiefs of Defence. Its main tasks are to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.
The proposal for an EU Army (or Armed Forces) is probably a proposal to overcome the shortcomings in the lack of EU-owned permanent HQs, Military and Civilian Staff, planning time and to remove from the Council, and place in the hands of the Commission, the right to agree and direct military missions without recourse to ‘national authorities’. It would be another ‘nail in the coffin’ of national sovereignty that is a fundamental principle of NATO’s Treaty articles. Further, it has to be suspected that the EU would seek to replace France and the UK in the UN Security Council and – ultimately, possibly – exercise control over national authorities’ nuclear weapons.
Given that successive UK governments have stated that NATO remains the bedrock foundation of UK security, it is surprising that current arguments are that remaining in the EU is a vital component of national security. Without NATO, EU military missions are under-resourced and feeble – and will remain so. The EU’s wealthiest ‘member’ has neglected its armed forces miserably. Many, in fact nearly all, EU ‘members’ are NATO sovereign states and can cooperate better along well-rehearsed NATO political, military and logistical procedures. To set up a parallel system would carry an immense cost in structure and additional personnel, but without commitment to greatly increase national defence budgets, already crippled by austerity. As such, the proposed EU Armed Forces would be nothing but a ‘paper tiger’. The EU needs NATO for its defence.
U.K. NATIONAL DEFENCE ASSOCIATION
President: Cdr John Muxworthy RN
Board of Directors: David Wedgwood (Chairman), Cdr Graham Edmonds RN (Vice-Chairman), Andy Smith (Chief Executive Officer), Col Peter Walton
Company Secretary: David Robinson
UKNDA Ltd, PO Box 819, Portsmouth PO1 9FF. Tel 023 9283 1728. Email [email protected]
www.uknda.org Company No. 06254639 Follow us on Twitter @DefenceAssoc
June 2016
NATO or EU? The Way Forward for UK Defence & Security
By Graham J.L. Edmonds
NATO and the EU both have 28 members. Those that belong to NATO are described as ‘sovereign states’, whilst those of the EU as ‘national authorities’ or ‘member states’. Twenty-two EU nations belong to NATO; those that do not are Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Malta. Sweden stayed out of NATO in solidarity with Finland, which stays out so as not to antagonise Russia.
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty setting up NATO states that “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self- defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
Provision for enlargement is given by Article 10 which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.
Currently, Montenegro has started accessions talks and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are aspiring members. It is believed that Sweden, under military threat from Russia, is considering foregoing its neutrality in order to join and gain the benefits of Article 5.
On the other hand the EU needs armed forces under command to substantiate its desire for political union. In a step-by-step process following the War in Kosovo, which included disbanding the ‘Western European Union (or NATO Europe) in 2010, the European Council agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”
A number of efforts were made to increase the EU's military capability by the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’ process from which the most concrete result is the EU Battlegroups initiative. EU member states were highly motivated – initially – to volunteer for the ‘Battlegroup roster’, but as the member states have to cover their own costs a certain level of reluctance has become apparent. Additionally many EU member states had simultaneous obligations to fulfil ISAF and the NATO Response Force commitments, for example. Further, and despite obvious occasions when EU Battlegroups should have been deployed (e.g. Congo in 2006/2008 and Libya 2011), slow political decision-making has meant that deployment has not occurred and there have been increasing ‘absenteeism’ in the standby roster.
The EU is further hamstrung by shortfalls in sealift and airlift capability, and by having to rely on the USA or extensive chartering to fill a significant military shortcoming.
In the 70 years since NATO was founded it has set in place and reformed a series of HQs, subordinate HQs and command centres. It has specifically set out to standardise equipment and logistics and virtually every component of equipment has a Nato Stock Number (NSN). Standardisation ensures that, for example, fuel hoses and connections for ships, aircraft and vehicles are common; communication and data links connect Treaty members, relevant intelligence is shared and common operating procedures ensure that military formations can co-operate together. Standing NATO Maritime Forces, in being since the 1960s are charged to improve and prove standardisation. English and French are NATO’s two working languages.
The UK has the 5th largest defence budget in the world and France the 6th. The UK and France together account for 40% of the EU's defence budget and 50% of its military capacity. Both are officially recognised nuclear weapon states and have permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council
Any EU force is obliged – if it is to function militarily – to use the organisation set up by NATO. Much common equipment, particularly in aircraft and missiles (ship, ground and air launched), is US in origin, support and training. Even the French Navy’s air arm (Aeronavale) conducts its carrier flying qualifications with the USN in the T45 Goshawk – a derivative of BAe Hawk trainer. EU operations such as the Libyan campaign of 2011 could not have ‘succeeded’ without considerable US air support (non-combat) operations in Air to Air Refuelling, Electronic Warfare, Reconnaissance and Intelligence, nor without an initial bombardment by land attack cruise missiles from USN ships and RN and USN submarines.
It is important to understand that the EU does not – yet – directly control EU military missions. When an EU military mission is agreed an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is nominated by the EU Council. The OHQ directs the Force Headquarters (FHQ), also provided by a member country, which carries out the operation. It is worthy of note that the European Council has no formal legislative power, it is a strategic (and crisis-solving!) body that provides the Union with general political directions and priorities and acts as a ‘collective presidency’. The European Commission remains the sole initiator of legislation, but the European Council is able to provide an impetus to guide legislative policy. Decisions of the European Council are taken by consensus, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.
When an EU operation is planned and conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the OHQ is automatically the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), (formerly SHAPE) at Mons. Without NATO support there is the option of using one of five national HQs provided by the French (2 HQs), the UK (PJHQ at the Northwood), Germany and Italy. Alternatively the EU has the option to use NATO facilities.
The EU has a military staff of some 200+ military and civilian personnel based in Brussels. It provides strategic advice to the High Representative and reports to the European Union Military Committee, an intergovernmental Council body made up of the Chiefs of Defence. Its main tasks are to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.
The proposal for an EU Army (or Armed Forces) is probably a proposal to overcome the shortcomings in the lack of EU-owned permanent HQs, Military and Civilian Staff, planning time and to remove from the Council, and place in the hands of the Commission, the right to agree and direct military missions without recourse to ‘national authorities’. It would be another ‘nail in the coffin’ of national sovereignty that is a fundamental principle of NATO’s Treaty articles. Further, it has to be suspected that the EU would seek to replace France and the UK in the UN Security Council and – ultimately, possibly – exercise control over national authorities’ nuclear weapons.
Given that successive UK governments have stated that NATO remains the bedrock foundation of UK security, it is surprising that current arguments are that remaining in the EU is a vital component of national security. Without NATO, EU military missions are under-resourced and feeble – and will remain so. The EU’s wealthiest ‘member’ has neglected its armed forces miserably. Many, in fact nearly all, EU ‘members’ are NATO sovereign states and can cooperate better along well-rehearsed NATO political, military and logistical procedures. To set up a parallel system would carry an immense cost in structure and additional personnel, but without commitment to greatly increase national defence budgets, already crippled by austerity. As such, the proposed EU Armed Forces would be nothing but a ‘paper tiger’. The EU needs NATO for its defence.
U.K. NATIONAL DEFENCE ASSOCIATION
President: Cdr John Muxworthy RN
Board of Directors: David Wedgwood (Chairman), Cdr Graham Edmonds RN (Vice-Chairman), Andy Smith (Chief Executive Officer), Col Peter Walton
Company Secretary: David Robinson
UKNDA Ltd, PO Box 819, Portsmouth PO1 9FF. Tel 023 9283 1728. Email [email protected]
www.uknda.org Company No. 06254639 Follow us on Twitter @DefenceAssoc
June 2016