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COMMENTARY: On Tactical Nuclear Weapons
 
The subject has made front page news – “British fighter jets to carry nuclear bombs”. The RAF is to acquire a fleet of F-35A strike fighters that can carry the American B61 nuclear bomb. Furthermore, a columnist has come up with the old argument about having tactical nuclear weapons to use in the event of being over-run by superior enemy ground forces, in other words using tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute for adequate conventional forces. Yes, we need tactical nuclear weapons, but not these weapons and not for that reason. 
 
Let’s go back to first principles. Britain has a strategic nuclear deterrent in the shape of four ballistic missiles subs armed with Trident. One submarine is on patrol at any given time and its credibility depends on its location remaining secret. The purpose of the strategic deterrent is to deter a major Russian (or other) nuclear strike on Britain by threatening retaliation in kind. But what would we do if Russia (or anyother rogue state) were to use, or threaten to use, a limited number of small tactical weapons on British targets either in the UK or elsewhere in the world? We do not have an appropriate counter-threat to deter any such aggression. It has been argued that our one ballistic missile submarine on patrol could fire just one missile with just one warhead at a tactical target but that is not sensible for two reasons. 
 
• Firstly, Russia could not be sure if this was the start of a strategic strike and might over-react accordingly.
• Secondly, and more pertinently, firing just one missile would disclose the location of our one submarine and (fatally?) compromise it in its role as a strategic deterrent.  
Our Trident submarines cannot and should not be used to do both strategic and tactical roles. All the nuclear weapons states except the UK have separate weapon systems for the different roles. So should we. 
 
What should or could we have, exactly? France has an Independent Nuclear Deterrent that is genuinely French – the submarines, missiles and warheads of their strategic deterrent and the aircraft, missiles and warheads of their tactical nuclear forces, all French. We should aim to emulate France. Specifically, some French Rafale fighter-jets are armed with the ASMP stand-off missile (range 300-600km) and the missiles are each armed with a single TN-81 warhead (100-300Kt yield). 
 
The simplest solution might be to arm our Typhoon fighters with a nuclear-tipped version of the Storm Shadow. Storm Shadow has a range of 300km. The Trident Alternatives Review 
published by the Coalition Government in 2013 said it might take a quarter-century to develop a warhead suitable for a cruise missile, a claim that was greeted with some disbelief. The government should re-open this discussion, urgently. 
 
The problems with using the F-35A armed with the American B61 bombs are several:
 
• The B61 is a free-fall weapon requiring the aircraft carrying it to get close to or even inside the air defences of the enemy. It has been discussed elsewhere that, in a conventional role, it is not desirable to arm the F-35s with the free-fall Paveway bomb for the same reason, and pressure is being put upon the USA to integrate the Spear-3 (conventional) stand-off missile (range 140km).
• Even though the F-35 is ‘Stealthy’ with low-observability to enemy radars it is not completely invisible nor is it invulnerable. It will become visible to enemy radars as soon as the weapons bay doors are opened. Furthermore, future advances in radars and computers will render the F-35 and other ‘Stealthy’ aircraft progressively less and less stealthy in years to come.
• There are issues with the F-35 generally. According to an answer to an MP’s question, it seems the USA keeps tight hold on the global supply of spare parts for the F-35 and also holds the computer codes that control the aircraft. Even though we have paid good money for these aircraft, we cannot customise or modify them to suit our needs in any way; the USA has to do this for us.  
What other options? One might consider fitting the Royal Navy’s Tomahawk cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, assuming the US would allow this. It is not beyond the UK to develop our own submarine-launched cruise missile should the US not cooperate. The aforementioned TridentAlternatives Review claimed it would take over 30 years to develop a low-radiation warhead! In British submarines the cruise missiles are fired through the torpedo tubes and stored alongside the crew accommodation, which might expose the crew to radiation from the warhead unless the warhead was specially designed. British submarines do not have vertical launch tubes which might get around this problem. Again, the government should re-open the discussion. 
 
Nuclear-tipped cruise missiles can be fired from the back of a truck, as were the US missiles based at Greenham Common. That is another option. There is also no good reason why the UK could not develop a truck-launched ballistic missile with a conventional warhead. So many other countries have done this, how hard could it be? 
 
Finally: Tactical nuclear weapons should exist solely to neutralise the threat of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. At present we have no appropriate or proportionate counter-threat with which to protect ourselves. To retaliate against Russian tactical weapons with Trident would be a massive over-reaction and a quick path to escalation. A retaliation with conventional weapons only would be an under-reaction and unlikely to deter. What we must NOT do is go back to the bad old days when nuclear weapons were seen as a substitute for adequate conventional forces. This was a frightening unstable game of poker and unlikely so receive much political support in this or any other European country. 
 
Steve Coltman – Defence UK Director
(June 2025)
 



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